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Some design requirements in the maritime industry and in other industries exist to cover operational 
and maintenance aspects but somehow fail to be applied in a human centered approach. Such bad 
designs create environments where operation and maintenance is performed with a higher risk than 
necessary (e.g. crowded working environment, valves too close to each other to be operated easily, 
valve/control difficult to reach, etc.). The aim of this paper is to implement Crew Centered Design 
(CCD) principles and by taking into account existing design requirements with respect to 
anthropometrical limitations to optimize the transfer of heavy equipment in a vessel's Engine Room 
(ER) by reducing the possibility of the human injuries and errors. In this context, the elaborated 
analysis is focused on two logistical aspects of the engine department: (1) movement of equipment 
and personnel within the machinery space to/from specified nodal locations and (2) movement of 
equipment to/from the ship’s main deck and the entrance(s) of the engine department. The optimal 
routes are illustrated in multiple drawings of different ERs based on the link analysis. Link analysis 
is a task description method that demonstrates a generalized summary of activities performed by 
crew members. This approach enables engine crew tasks located throughout a ships structure to be 
represented in General Arrangement (GA) drawings, revealing node connections, relationships and 
routes between key locations and functions within a physical space.    
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1. Introduction First-level heading 
In many industries it is now generally agreed (Markus, 2004) that Human Centred Design (HCD) 
can lead to decreased development costs, improved user productivity, reduced training costs, reduced 
customer service costs and Improved safety. A lot of human factors and ergonomics 
recommendations exist and ought to be applied in ship design process. However, there is often a 
distance between the designer, the regulator and the operator’ perspectives. By introducing Human 
Factor (HF) at the ship design phase, the designer has the ability, across the whole design process, to 
identify mainly the needs of the crew members, to integrate their needs and to evaluate his work 
towards this objective.  Figure 1 illustrates (Mery & McGregor, 2010) a suggestion for Human 
Centred Design method for ship designs from Bureau Veritas. It all starts with some data collection 
and user feedback investigation. Once this information is collected and analysed, it can feed a first 
reflection on the different sources of hazard on board ships, but also help analyse the human-
machine interactions and define a first set of prescribed tasks. This first set of prescribed tasks and 
the analysis of the real activities on board will help reiterate on hazard identification and human 
machine interaction analysis. These two steps will influence the design and the arrangement of the 
machinery spaces. In return design modifications may interact back with other hazards identified or 
human-machine interactions or other prescribed task / real activities. In that case (if necessary) a 
control loop is to be planned and is represented with the dotted arrows. Ultimately, these iterations 
between design and human centred approach will feed typical ship design spiral and ultimately lead 
to more human centred ship designs.  
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Figure 1. Suggested methodology for deriving standard design requirements based on human 
factors and ergonomics (possibly iterative: dotted lines). 
 
The following procedure is emerged from the suggested methodology for deriving standard design 
requirements based on human factors and ergonomics (Figure 1). The initial step is the collection of 
statistical casualty data. Once this information is collected and analysed, it can shed light on the 
different sources of hazard on board ships and define a first set of prescribed tasks. This approach is 
applied to a vessel’s Engine Room by analyzing the transportation of different heavy equipment. At 
first, the layout of a modern Engine Room is presented, with focus on the task of multiply equipment 
replacement procedure. By breaking down the objective, the identification of threats becomes easier. 
The next step is to assess the possibility of occurrence for each of the above threats, as well as its 
severity. The risk posed by each threat can be evaluated by comparison of possibility and severity. 
The final step is to identify ways to reduce those risks and prioritize the methods according to 
easiness of implementation. The purpose is to produce viable solutions that can be easily integrated 
during the design phase and ultimately to lead to more human centered ship designs. 
 
2. Presentation of statistical data with respect to occupational safety onboard ships 
The motivation for the identification of workplace and individual factors that combine to affect 
human performance (i.e. injury and error) during the performance of operational and maintenance 
tasks was based on collecting statistical casualty data in a database search, as well as performing a 
literature review. This section presents data from several sources regarding the accidents that are 
happening onboard. Figure 2 shows the number of different types of accidents per year, ranging from 
1985 to 2008 (Mullai & Paulsson, 2011). 
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Figure 2. Different types of accidents per year. 
 
Figure 3 depicts the number of injuries and deaths from 1998 to 2011 (MAIB, 2011). By the use of 
linear regression, the plot clearly indicates a declining tendency.  Injuries tend to decline over the 
years –but with greater fluctuations- whereas death toll remains close to constant. Furthermore the 
percentage of accidents that lead to loss of life is much smaller than the one leading to injury (98.4% 
versus 1.6%).  Figure 4 illustrates the categorization of the accidents per ship location for the time 
period 2013-2014 based on (HBMCI, 2013-2014). It is obvious that the space where there is 
significant risk of an accident is the engine room. The probability of an accident in the engine room 
is 24% along with category “other space”, which are the biggest percentages of accident among the 
spaces of the ship. The category “other space” is referred to all the other accidents that cannot be 
sorted into a certain category. For that reason “other space” contains such a large percentage of 
accidents. Due to that fact, the engine room is one of the most hazardous spaces of the ship to work 
in. 
 
  4 
Figure 3. The number of injuries and deaths from 1998 to 2011. 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of accidents per ship location for the period 2013-2014. 
 
3. Transportation of heavy equipment: Procedure Analysis 
According to the Planned Maintenance System (PMS) for machinery spaces, a number of necessary 
activities should be carried out periodically to ensure proper function of the main engine and 
auxiliary systems. Since repairs are implemented in the workshop and new replacement parts should 
be transferred from outside, lifting equipment is necessary. Cranes should be able to carry the 
equipment to various places inside the engine room, as well as to the upper deck.  
 
This investigation focused on two logistical aspects of the engine department: (1) movement of 
equipment and personnel within the machinery space to/from specified nodal locations and (2) 
movement of equipment to/from the ship’s main deck and the entrance(s) of the engine department. 
The illustration of these routes in multiple drawings of different ERs based on the link analysis. Link 
analysis is a task description method that produces a more generalized summary of activities 
performed by end-users, focusing on operator actions rather than work-defined tasks (Getka, 2011) 
and (Mallam, 2014). Link analysis allows engine crew tasks located throughout a ships structure to 
be represented in GA drawings, revealing node connections, relationships and routes between key 
locations and functions within a physical space (Mallam & Lundh, 2014). . Full sets of two 
dimensional GA drawings of the entire structure, including top and cross-sectional perspectives of 
each deck level were used in the analysis. To illustrate the GA link analysis assessment method, the 
following engineering equipments were chosen to explore in detail:  
 The piston of the Main Engine (ME); 
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 A flange to the service jacket pump; 
 The oily water separator; 
 The motor of the air compressor; 
 The evaporator; 
Most of the selected equipments correspond to actual occupational incidents and accidents. 
3.1 Piston Replacement  
Two distinct procedures involving a piston are selected as a case study.  
 Piston repair: The piston has to be transferred into the workshop, where maintenance work 
can be properly conducted. After completion, the part returns to its original position, being 
placed back at the cylinder.  
 Piston replacement: The process requires the piston to be removed and be transferred out of 
the ship. According to the General Arrangement, a hatch opening inside the workshop 
leading to the upper deck can be used for this purpose.  
 
In this case, a 34,000 DWT handymax Bulk Carrier - General Arrangement plans provide basic crane 
path information. According to the plans, an overhead crane is placed close to 2nd deck ceiling, right 
above the main engine area. Since there are openings through 2nd and 3rd deck, the crane can lower to 
reach even the lowest place onboard, the 4th deck. Its lifting capacity can range from 0.5 tons to 15 
tons. Below follows the link analysis of the two aforementioned maintenance working schemes 
(Figures 5 and 6). 
 
 
Figure 5. GA of the aft machinery space upper deck nodal linkages. 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
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In order to transfer the piston (1) (weight: 930 kg, length: 2.855 m, diameter: 0.5 m) from the main 
engine (MAN B&W 6S50-C, type: low speed, power: 9,480 kW), the route passes via a hoist (2) 
inside the workshop (3). An onshore crane then lowers (4) inside the open hatch and lifts away the 
object (5). Either the onboard crane or an onshore installation can remove the part from the open 
hatch. During the process the piston must be carefully lifted in order to eliminate sway movements 
that can cause the item to collide with nearby objects (e.g. the hatch opening). 
 
 
Figure 6. GA of the aft machinery space nodal linkages – Port elevation view. 
 
 
4. Risk assessment 
The risk management is divided into two pillars. On the one hand there is the reactive approach 
where in this case when an accident occurs a root cause analysis is performed for the identification of 
the triggering factor and then different measures are applied in order to avoid in the future similar of 
identical types of accidents. On the other hand there is the proactive approach whereas measures are 
applied in advance focusing on the reduction of the accidents by simultaneously enhancing the safety 
and the productivity of the seafarers during operational and maintenance procedures. Analytically, 
the IMO (1998) has introduced a 7 × 4 risk matrix, reflecting the greater potential variation for 
frequencies than that for consequences. To facilitate the ranking and validation of ranking, 
consequence and frequency indices are defined on a logarithmic scale. The so-called “risk index” is 
established by adding the frequency and consequence indices. Based on this index risk matrixes 
regarding the transfer of heavy equipment inside the ER are developed. The whole process was 
supervised by three experts. The elaborated equipments are the following: 
 A flange for the service jacket pump; 
 The piston of the Main Engine (ME) 
 The oily water separator; 
 The motor of the air compressor. 
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The table 1 presents a segment of the final risk index matrix for the transportation of the piston 
of the ME from the ER to the deck. 
 
Table 1. Risk index matrix for the transportation of the piston of the ME from the ER to 
the deck. 
No Tasks/Incidents Existing 
control 
measures 
Severity 
Index 
(SI) 
Frequency 
Index(FI) 
Risk Index 
( RI=SI+FI ) 
Risk control options Severity 
Index 
(SI) 
Frequency 
Index(FI) 
Risk Index 
( RI=SI+FI ) 
1 Electric shock and 
serious injury due 
to incorrect 
maintenance of 
the jacket pump. 
1) Personal 
protective 
equipment 
(PPE) as 
defined by 
the ISM 
code of the 
shipping 
company. 
2) 
Maintenan
ce work on 
electrical 
equipment 
is made 
only by the 
qualified 
personnel 
(e.g. 
electrician)
. 
2 3 5 1)Placement  of the 
switch machine to the 
OFF position from the 
local switchboard 
2)  Placement of special 
warning signs 'Man At 
Work- Do Not Start' not 
only at the local board but 
also at the board of the 
Engine Control Room. 
3) Usage of dry fabric and 
avoidance of wet spots  
4) Usage of shoes with 
rubber sole 
5) Usage of insulated 
tools  
1 1 2 
2 Fall due to lack of 
maintenance 
of the ER spaces 
1) Personal 
protective 
equipment 
(PPE) as 
defined by 
the ISM 
code of the 
shipping 
company. 
 
2 3 5 1) Railings, safe passage 
corridors and attachment 
points should be 
distinguishably colored 
(e.g. yellow colour). 
2) In the safe passage 
corridors and stairways, 
the paint should contain a 
sufficient amount of sand 
in order to improve the 
traction. 
1 1 2 
3 Fall due to lack of 
cleanliness 
1) Personal 
protective 
equipment 
(PPE) as 
defined by 
the ISM 
code of the 
shipping 
company. 
 
2 3 5 1) Workplaces and 
especially and stairwells 
should be clean from dirt 
and grease. 
1 1 2 
4 Transport of 
heavy equipment 
by mechanical 
means 
(falls and  
conflicts of heavy 
loads) 
 
1) Personal 
protective 
equipment 
(PPE) as 
defined by 
the ISM 
code of the 
shipping 
company. 
 
3 3 6 1) Use of lifting 
appliances which are 
marked in a stable manner 
with the values of the 
Safe Working Load 
(SWL). 
2) Use of lifting gear with 
SWL more than the 
weight of the selected 
equipment to transfer. 
3) Use of the fastening 
means with appropriate 
methods in each case. 
4) Check the fastening 
means for visible signs of 
deterioration. 
5) Use of lifting gear and 
fastening means which 
are approved and certified 
by the class and their 
certifications are still 
valid. 
2 1 3 
 
5. Conclusions 
The constant effort of maritime organizations has led to a steady decrease in the number of accidents. 
Awareness and a strict regulatory system are the main forces behind maritime safety. However, the 
main cause of accidents is still the same: The day-to-day operations on board. These operations have 
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been clearly recorded and carefully planned out by a series of regulations. Why then do these 
accidents occur over and over again? Not suitably qualified crew members, low maintenance, a rush 
in time are only some of the contributing factors that lead to injuries and casualties. This process 
aims at the reduction of the potential for human injury and error by applying CCD principles in the 
design phase, by taking into account existing design requirements – design boundaries / limits and by 
considering human anthropometrical, physiological and biomechanical limitations. The 
transportation of heavy equipment in the area of ER consists of only a small fraction with respect to 
the rest contributory factors. Nevertheless, the expected reduction of frequency of these 
incidents/accidents and the causes of the injuries completely justify the performed elaboration of the 
aforementioned task in the context of the HCD. 
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